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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the interaction between EU movement of persons and the access to and 
financing of public healthcare in the UK, Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The article will show 
that particularly in a time of relative austerity and a seeming lack of cross-border solidarity, the non-
discrimination obligations in the EU Treaties may encourage the Member States to cut back on tax-
funded healthcare so as to not have to extend such care to non-nationals. It suggests that if the 
Member States cannot effectively rebut the persistent public concerns of ‘EU welfare tourism’ with 
statistics, it may be preferable for them to seek to address those fears at the EU level (by a re-
coordination of responsibility for health care coverage) than to respond to them through domestic 
law (by increasing individual responsibility for health care costs). 
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Security Coordination 
 
1. Introduction 
Might ‘Brexit’ repeat elsewhere?  Current political positions of even the most Eurosceptic parties 
suggest that it will not1… but it would be naive to take those outcomes as evidence that all the 
motivations underpinning the UK vote to leave the EU are exclusive to the UK.   
One clear driver of the ‘Brexit’ vote was the future of the (English) National Health Service.2  The 
Leave Campaign honed in on public fears and amplified them: money that was being sent to the EU 
could be used to fund the struggling NHS instead3, the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) was going to result in the NHS being effectively ‘sold’ to the highest US bidder, 
                                                          
* sylvia.de-mars@ncl.ac.uk, Senior Lecturer in Law, Newcastle Law School.  The research conducted in this 
article was graciously funded by the Newcastle University Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences’ Faculty 
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1 See, for example, Jon Stone, ‘Has Brexit trashed any chance of other countries leaving the EU?’ (19 December 
2018, independent) available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-nexit-irexit-
meaningful-vote-mark-rutte-theresa-may-latest-a8689621.html (last accessed 20 May 2019). 
2 Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England operate independent health services. However, England is a 
representative case study for all four national health services in the UK on the issues of financing and access 
specifically, and references to ‘the NHS’ or ‘the UK NHS’ in this article refer to the English NHS. 
3 See, for example, Jon Stone, ‘British public still believe ‘Vote Leave’s £350million a week to EU’ myth from 
Brexit referendum’ (28 October 2018, independent) available at 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/vote-leave-brexit-lies-eu-pay-money-remain-poll-boris-
johnson-a8603646.html (accessed 20 May 2019). 
and EU membership meant that a potentially limitless numbers of migrants could come to the UK 
and immediately start using the NHS without paying for their care.4  Public polling throughout the 
referendum campaign5 suggests that concerns about the viability of the NHS, and how much 
pressure was being put on its resources by EU nationals who moved to the UK, was of significant 
public concern.6 The fact that 2014 statistics made clear that EU nationals are net contributors to the 
UK economy did nothing to mitigate the concern in question: EU membership, and its accompanying 
free movement of people, were widely viewed as a threat to the sustainability of the NHS.7 
The setup of the English NHS, the referendum, and public sentiment about intra-EU migration 
created a ‘perfect storm’ in the UK, at least in part responsible for the Brexit vote – but what this 
article will demonstrate is that the interaction of EU law and domestic law that underpinned that 
storm could easily result in a backlash in other EU Member States. Austerity (whether domestically 
driven or EU/Troika-driven) has resulted in more general pressure on public health care systems 
across the EU, and given that the costs of healthcare are only going to increase, bearing those costs 
for other EU citizens (who are frequently portrayed as  outsiders) could easily become politically 
problematic across the EU.8  As Kvist found following EU enlargement, the perception of welfare 
                                                          
4 See, for an overview, Sophie Arie, ‘What the leave campaign said about the NHS, and how the experts 
answered’ (16 June 2016, BMJ) available at https://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i3261 (accessed 20 May 
2019). 
5 See, for instance, NatCen Social Research What UK Thinks surveys asking about foreigner’s access to the NHS 
for free (available at https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/are-you-in-favour-of-or-opposed-to-stopping-
people-from-other-eu-countries-getting-nhs-treatment-for-free/) and what the effect of predicted EU 
immigration levels would be on the NHS (available at https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/what-would-be-
the-impact-of-the-predicted-level-of-immigration-of-three-million-people-coming-from-the-eu-into-the-uk-
over-the-next-14-years-on-the-nhs-and-other-public-services/) (accessed 20 May 2019). 
6 The concern remains to date. See, for example, the 2018 NatCen’s British Social Attitudes survey (available at 
https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/blog/2019/03/what-does-public-think-about-nhs-and-brexit), where almost 
half of those in favour of Brexit thought it would benefit the NHS because fewer foreign nationals would be 
treated. 
7 See Commission ‘EU Employment and Social Situation – Quarterly Review – Supplement on Mobility’ (June 
2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11945&langId=en (accessed 20 May 2019), 
suggesting that of the 10.3 million EU nationals exercising free movement rights in 2014, 77.7% were 
economically active. See also Social Situation Monitor ‘Access of mobile EU citizens to social protection’ 
(Research note No 10/2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11568&langId=en 
(accessed 2 January 2017), finding that EU migrants in general rely less on non-contributory benefits than host 
State nationals do. 
8 See, for example, S Greer, H Jarman, and R Baeten, ‘The New Political Economy of Health Care in the 
European Union: The Impact of Fiscal Governance’ (2016) 46(2) International Journal of Health Services 262. 
generosity to ‘outsiders’ results governmental action even if that perception is unfounded and/or 
does not result in significant problems of service sustainability in practice.9 
The article will explore four healthcare systems in the EU, starting with the UK’s fully-residency 
based National Health Service and then considering healthcare systems that operate on a mixture of 
insurance-and-residency based principles (Ireland) or are predominantly or fully insurance-based 
(Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively).  It will set out how free movement of persons interacts 
with these different healthcare systems, and to what extent this promotes or discourages the 
perception that EU law facilitates access to healthcare for ‘undeserving’ EU migrants.10 The analysis 
will show how the Netherlands have arranged its public healthcare system in an EU-law compliant 
manner that seemingly prevents a perception of ‘undeserving’ access, but that much like the UK, 
Belgium and Ireland are at some risk of being perceived as overly generous to EU migrants and their 
ability to access ‘free’ healthcare.  
The article will conclude by recommending that the Member States start using EU law to protect 
national healthcare organization from these perceived negative effects of a mobile EU citizenry.  
Proposals for EU-level legislative action to ensure that free movement of persons cannot be seen as 
‘attacking’ the sustainability of national healthcare systems should ultimately benefit both the 
Member States and the EU, and in the aftermath of Brexit, should restore at least some public 
confidence in the EU project as a whole. 
2. Public Healthcare Systems in the EU: An Introduction 
                                                          
9 J Kvist, ‘Does EU Enlargement Start a Race to the Bottom? Strategic Interaction among EU Member States in 
Social Policy’ (2004) 14(3) Journal of European Social Policy 301 
10 See, similarly, M Dougan, ‘Expanding the Frontiers of Union Citizenship by Dismantling the Territorial 
Boundaries of the National Welfare States?’ in C Barnard and O Odudu (eds) The Outer Limits of European 
Union Law (Oxford: Hart 2009) pp 119-121; Grainne de Burca (ed) EU Law and the Welfare State (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
Though each Member State has a distinct method of both funding and organizing access to its public 
healthcare system, very generally, Member States of the European Union have operated public 
healthcare along a scale that ranges from fully residency-based to fully insurance-based.11   
Under the insurance-based model, Member States operate systems wherein the population ‘buys’ 
access to the healthcare system through a form of (social) insurance.  This model is found (in various 
forms) in many continental European countries.  Until the late 1970s, all six original Member States 
operated insurance-style healthcare systems, albeit in different ways.12  Most states that acceded to 
the EU from the 1970s, however organize their healthcare systems under a residency-based model.13  
Under this model, citizens are not insured against illness, but rather benefit (on the basis of what 
historically has been nationality of a state and is now generally ‘residence’ in a state) from universal 
coverage through a tax-funded ‘national health service’, free at the point of use.14   
The two insurance-based systems that are considered in this article are Belgium, which has operated 
a distinct hybridized social security system since 1944,15 and the Netherlands, which drastically 
changed the setup of its own system in 2006.16  The English NHS17 is one of the two residency-based 
                                                          
11 On the structuring and financing of Member State healthcare systems, see, inter alia, the European 
Observatory on Health Systems and Policy Health Systems in Transition Reviews, available at 
http://www.euro.who.int/en/about-us/partners/observatory/publications/health-system-reviews-hits 
(accessed 20 May 2019); A Oliver and E Mossialos ‘European Health Systems Reforms: Looking Backward to 
see Forward?’ (2005) 30(1-2) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 7; S Greer The Politics of European 
Union Health Policies (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009). 
12 Italy switched to a national health service in 1978; see Oliver and Mossialos, ibid, p 14. 
13 An exception is Austria, but it did not accede to the EU until 1995; Spain and Greece started operating 
residency-based systems by the time they acceded (see ibid.)  
14 Some medical services, such as optometry, dentistry and payments for prescription medication, may require 
a patient contribution; but primary and secondary treatment is normally not charged for.  This differs per 
country (see, inter alia, European Observatory on Health Systems and Policy Health Systems in Transition 
Reviews, above n 11). 
15 See, on Belgian healthcare organization, S Callens and J Peers (eds) Organisatie van de gezondheidszorg 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 3rd edn, 2015); P Hancké and P Vermeeren De Ziekenfondsen in Belgie: activiteiten, 
toezicht (Gent: Mys & Breesch, 2000); K-P Companje and others, Two Centuries of Solidarity: German, Belgian 
and Dutch Social Health Insurance 1770-2008 (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009). 
16 See, on Dutch healthcare organization, GJ Hamilton Een zorgverzekering voor iedereen; zorgverzekeringswet 
en Wet op de Zorgtoeslag (Deventer: Kluwer 2005); CC Beerepoot De Zorgverzekering en de Wet op de 
zorgtoeslag (Houten: Bohn Stafleu van Loghum, 2nd edn, 2008); Companje and others, ibid.  
17 See generally R Klein, The New Politics of the NHS (Boca Raton: CRC, 7th edn, 2013); C Ham Health Policy in 
Britain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 6th edn, 2009); M Rintala, Creating the National Health Service: 
systems examined in this article. The other is the Irish healthcare system18, which has significant 
residency-based traits, but in which personal contributions play a much larger role than they do in 
the UK.  Relevant details about the operation of and funding of these four healthcare systems 
follows in the tables below. 
  
                                                          
Aneurin Bevan and the Medical Lords (London: Frank Cass, 2003); C Webster The National Health Service: A 
Political History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
18 See generally M-A Wren Unhealthy State: Anatomy of a Sick Society (Dublin: New Island 2003); B Harvey 
Evolution of Health Services and Health Policy in Ireland (Dublin: Combat Poverty Agency, 2007); S Burke Irish 
Apartheid: Healthcare Inequality in Ireland (Dublin: New Island, 2009); P O’Morain The Health of the Nation: 
The Irish Healthcare System 1957-2007 (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2007). 
Table 1: Organisation of Healthcare in Belgium 
‘Type’ of System Funding of System Individual Costs  Government Support for 
those on Low (or No) 
Incomes 
Insurance-style, 
covered by either 
employment 
contributions or 
social 
contributions. 
In 2016, 61% of expenditure 
was employer/employee 
contributions; 18% was 
central government 
funding;19 and private costs 
make up 21% of overall 
healthcare expenditure.20 
 
Those without employment 
pay stand-alone ‘social 
contributions’ to access 
public healthcare.21 
A combination of 
deductibles, non-
covered medical 
treatment, as well as 
private voluntary 
insurances to 
supplement the 
compulsory sickness 
insurance are paid for 
by individuals.   
 
Out-of-pocket 
healthcare costs 
represented 6.6% of 
average Belgian 
household expenses 
in 2017.22 
Social security contributions 
and sickness fund premiums 
will be lower or may not be 
collected at all.23  Families 
may additionally qualify for a 
means-tested ‘higher 
reimbursement’ which 
reduces the co-payment 
required for certain types of 
treatment.24   
 
The Belgian government also 
applies an annual cap on co-
payments in the shape of a 
‘Maximum Bill’.25 
 
 
  
                                                          
19 Statistics compiled via the World Health Organization’s Global Health Expenditure Database, available at 
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Home/Index/en (accessed 20 May 2019). 
20 Ibid; this percentage has not changed significantly in the last ten years. 
21 See Art. 70, Wet van 9 Augustus 1963 tot instelling en organisatie van een regeling voor verplichte 
verzekering voor geneeskundige verzorging en uitkeringen, B.S. 1 November 1963; current contributions can 
be seen at RIZIV ‘Persoonlijke Bijdragen’, available at http://www.riziv.fgov.be/nl/themas/kost-
terugbetaling/verzekerbaarheid/Paginas/persoonlijke-bijdragen.aspx (accessed 20 May 2019). 
22 Figure compiled via Eurostat’s Final Consumption Household Expenditure data sets, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=nama_co3_c&mode=view  (accessed 20 May 2019) and K van 
den Bosch and P Willemé De Maatschappelijke Betekenis van de gezondheidszorg (January 2014, Federaal 
Planbureau), available at http://www.plan.be/admin/uploaded/201402050952060.RIZIV_eindrapport.pdf  
(accessed 20 May 2019) pp 77-90. 
23 For limits to personal contributions, see RIZIV ‘Persoonlijke Bijdragen’, above n 21. 
24 Koninklijk besluit van 15 januari 2014 betreffende de verhoogde verzekeringstegemoetkoming, bedoeld in 
artikel 37, § 19, van de wet betreffende de verplichte verzekering voor geneeskundige verzorging en 
uitkeringen, gecoördineerd op 14 juli 1994, B.S. 29 January 2014. 
25 When this value is exceeded, government refunds the relevant health expenses to the patient.  See RIZIV 
‘Types Maximumfactuur’ (2019), available at http://www.inami.fgov.be/nl/themas/kost-
terugbetaling/financiele-toegankelijkheid/Paginas/types-maximumfactuur-(MAF).aspx (accessed 20 May 
2019). 
Table 2: Organisation of Healthcare in the Netherlands 
‘Type’ of 
System 
Funding of System Individual Costs  Government Support 
for those on Low (or 
No) Incomes 
Insurance-
based 
Employer contributions26 and 
compulsory individual 
insurance premiums27 
together are 62%.28 31% is 
government funding29 for 
long-term care and minors 
who do not themselves 
contribute, as well as a 
payment to compensate 
insurers for the compulsory 
covering of ‘high-risk’ 
patients.30 
 
Private payments aside from 
the insurance premiums are 
7% of the overall healthcare 
expenditure.    
The so-called ‘nominal’ insurance 
premium all Dutch adult residents are 
due is an average of 118 euros per 
month in 2019.31  Nominal premium 
aside, private payments cover any 
supplementary insurance (dental, 
ophthalmological, private rooms in 
hospital etc),32 as well as the ‘own 
risk’ payment of at least 385 euros 
this is a statutory deductible below 
which insurers will not refund 
medical expenses.33 
 
Out-of-pocket healthcare expenses 
(excluding insurance premiums) 
accounted for approximately 3.4% of 
average Dutch household 
expenditure in 2016.34 
The government 
makes a general-tax-
funded means-tested 
benefit called the 
‘zorgtoeslag’ 
available to all those 
legally resident in the 
Netherlands.35   
 
While the 
‘zorgtoeslag’ is 
progressive, it never 
covers the entirety of 
the nominal 
premium.36 
 
  
                                                          
26 Zorgverzekeringswet Arts 41-45; Hamilton, above n 16, pp 35-36. 
27 Zorgverzekeringswet Arts 16-18. 
28 Calculated using data from Rjiksoverheid ‘Financiering van de Zorguitgaven’ (2019, Rijksbegroting), available 
at http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2019/voorbereiding/begroting,kst248591_31.html (accessed 20 May 2019). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Zorgverzekeringswet Arts 54-56; Companje and others, above n 12, pp 358-359. 
31 Hamilton, above n 16, p 35; statistics compiled via Zorgwijzer, ‘Zorgverzekering 2019: alle premies bekend 
(overzicht)’ (2018, zorgwijzer), available at https://www.zorgwijzer.nl/zorgverzekering-2019/zorgverzekering-
2019-alle-premies-bekend-overzicht (accessed 20 May 2019). 
32 Hamilton, above n 16, p 89. 
33 Zorgverzekeringswet Art 19; Hamilton, above n 16, p 36; secondary legislation excludes maternity care, care 
for certain chronic illnesses and primary care from the deductible (see Rijksoverheid ‘Wat is het eigen risico 
van mijn zorgverzekering en wanneer betaal ik dit?’ (2019), available at 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/eigen-risico-zorgverzekering 
(accessed 20 May 2019).) 
34 Figure compiled via Eurostat’s Final Consumption Household Expenditure data sets, above n 22.   
35 Wet van 16 juni 2005, houdende regels inzake de aanspraak op een financiële tegemoetkoming in de premie 
van een zorgverzekering vanwege een laag inkomen (Wet op de zorgtoeslag) (Staatsblad 2005, 369) 
36 See Belastingdienst ‘Bedragen zorgtoeslag per maand’ (2019), available at 
https://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontentnl/belastingdienst/prive/toeslagen/zorgtoeslag/
voorwaarden/inkomen/bedragen-zorgtoeslag-per-maand (accessed 20 May 2019), indicating that the 
maximum individual “zorgtoeslag” for 2019 is 1188 euros per year, whereas average premium costs will be 
1440 euros per year (see Zorgwijzer, above n 31). 
Table 3: Organisation of Healthcare in England (the UK) 
‘Type’ of System Funding of System Individual Costs  Government 
Support for those 
on Low (or No) 
Incomes 
Residence-based: 
anyone ‘ordinarily 
resident’ in the UK 
can access the NHS 
free at the point of 
use.37  This covers 
anyone adopting an 
‘abode’ voluntarily 
and for settled 
purposes ‘as part of 
the regular order of 
his life’, regardless of 
how long.38   
General government 
expenditure—directed at the 
NHS and related services—
accounted for 80% of total 
healthcare expenditure in the 
UK in 2016.39 The NHS is funded 
primarily through general 
taxation, which represented 
78% of the NHS’s annual funding 
in 2018.  National Insurance 
contributions (the UK equivalent 
of ‘social contributions’) 
accounted for 22% of the 
funding for the NHS in 2018.40 
 
Private household expenditure 
represented 19% of total 
healthcare expenditure in the 
UK in 2017.41   
Private household 
expenses include out-of-
pocket payment for 
medical goods (such as 
prescriptions and 
dentistry/optical care42) 
and for medical services 
(paid for without 
insurance) as well as 
private insurance costs.  
 
The percentage of 
average household 
expenditure on 
healthcare in the United 
Kingdom has been at 
most 1.8% in recent 
years.43 
There are no 
charges for 
certain population 
groups who 
cannot afford to 
pay for either 
prescriptions or 
optical or dental 
care.44  
 
 
                                                          
37 NHS Act 2006, s1(3) and s175. 
38 R v Barnet LBC, ex p Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, [1983] 2 WLR 16, as referenced by Department of Health 
‘Guidance on Implementing the overseas visitor charging regulations’ (December 2018), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771515/
Guidance_on_implementing_the_overseas_visitor_charging_regulations.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019), para 
3.5-3.10. 
39 World Health Organization, above n 19. 
40 Figures compiled using HMRC ‘Great Britain National Insurance Fund Account (For the year ended 31 March 
2018) (16 October 2018), available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748572/
Great_Britain_National_Insurance_Fund_Account_-_2017_to_2018.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019), p 16, and 
National Audit Office ‘Departmental Overview: Department of Health and Social Care 2017-18’ (October 2018), 
available at https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Departmental-Overview-Department-of-
Health-and-Social-Care.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019), p 5. 
41 Official of National Statistics ‘UK Health Accounts: 2017’ (25 April 2019) available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthcaresystem/bulletins/uk
healthaccounts/2017 (accessed 20 May 2019). 
42 Klein, above n 17, p 25; Ham, above n 17, p 240; Rintala, above n 17, p 137; Webster, above n 17, p 36. 
43 Figure compiled using statistics on both healthcare expenditure and private health insurance expenditure 
from the Office of National Statistics ,’Detailed household expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure by 
disposable income decile group: Table 3.2’ (24 January 2019) available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/expenditure/datas
ets/detailedhouseholdexpenditureasapercentageoftotalexpenditurebydisposableincomedecilegroupuktable32
e (accessed 20 May 2019). 
44 The Secretary of State for Health and Social care has estimated that 90% of prescriptions are provided for 
free (see Written Question 168190, available at https://www.parliament.uk/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/commons/2018-07-24/168190 (accessed 20 May 2019)). 
Table 4: Organisation of Healthcare in Ireland 
‘Type’ of System Funding of System Individual Costs  Government Support for 
those on Low (or No) 
Incomes 
Primarily residency-
style: anyone resident 
or demonstrating 
intentions to reside for 
at least a year in 
Ireland is ‘ordinarily 
resident’45 and can 
access the Irish public 
health system. 
In 2016, 72% of the 
overall financing of the 
health care system still 
originated in general 
taxation.  28% of the 
finance in the Irish 
health care system is 
private, of which 54% 
represents voluntary 
insurance and 46% 
represents out-of-
pocket expenses.46 
 
Above a set income 
threshold, patients 
have ‘limited 
eligibility’47 and are 
subject to charges for 
nearly all public 
healthcare,48 including 
prescriptions, GP visits49 
and overnight stays in 
hospitals.50   
 
In 2017, approximately 
44% of the Irish 
population held private 
health insurance51 to 
either cover the above 
costs, or to opt into 
fully private healthcare 
treatment. 
 
Out-of-pocket 
healthcare related 
expenditure made up 
5% of Irish household 
expenditure in 2016.52 
If below a set low income 
threshold and thus ‘fully 
eligible’, they are ‘medical 
card’ patients who access 
all services for free.53  If not 
‘fully eligible’ but also not 
above the ‘limited 
eligibility’ threshold, or if 
under 6 years old or over 
70 years old, they may 
qualify for a ‘GP visit’ 
card.54 
 
The Drugs Payment 
Scheme limits monthly 
payments for prescriptions 
to 134 euros for all Irish 
residents.55   
                                                          
45 s45-47 of the Health Act 1970 (Irl), as amended by Health (Amendment) Act 1991, s2-3; HSE ‘Who can access 
health services in Ireland?’ (2019), available at http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/Find_a_Service/eligibility.html 
(accessed 20 May 2019).  The Irish Citizens’ Information website suggests that being able to demonstrate 
employment, property ownership, and visa status are relevant to proving ‘ordinary residence’ status (see 
Citizens Information ‘Entitlement to health services’ (17 April 2019), available at 
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/health/health_system/entitlement_to_public_health_services.html 
(accessed 20 May 2019).) 
46 World Health Organization, above n 19. 
47 Health Act 1970 (Irl), s46 (as amended by the Health Services (Limited Eligibility) Regulations 1979). 
48 See, for current charges, Citizens Information ‘Charges for hospital services’ (29 April 2019), available at 
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/health/health_services/gp_and_hospital_services/hospital_charges.ht
ml  (accessed 20 May 2019). 
49 P Cullen ‘Cost of GP visit varies from €30 to €65 across State’ (7 July 2014, Irish Times), available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/cost-of-gp-visit-varies-from-30-to-65-across-state-1.1860540 
(accessed 20 May 2019); and OECD and European Observatory, above n 64, p 7. 
50 Currently 100 euros; Citizens Information ‘Charges for hospital services’, above n 48. 
51 OECD and the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, ‘State of Health in the EU: Ireland 
Country Health Profile 2017’, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/state/docs/chp_ir_english.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019), p 11. 
52 Figure compiled via Eurostat’s Final Consumption Household Expenditure data sets, above n 22. 
53 Health Act 1970 (Irl), s45. 
54 Health Act 1970 (Irl), s58 (as amended by Health (Amendment) Act 2005, s5); OECD and the European 
Observatory, above n 51, p 10. 
55 Health Act 1970 (Irl), s59 (as amended by Health Services (Drug Payment Scheme) Regulations 2017 (SI 
577/2017). 
The above tables will demonstrate that none of the four systems assessed in this article fully fit the 
‘residency-based’ or ‘insurance-based’ archetypes, and they all have substantial common qualities, 
amongst which is the fact that they are all rooted in an extent of solidarity: collective ‘input’ 
operates the system, and eligibility for care is not determined by individual contributions into the 
system.56   
That said, between the countries, there are clear differences in how solidarity has been balanced 
with individual responsibility for healthcare costs. The residency-based systems operate with greater 
solidarity than the insurance-based systems do: the Netherlands stands at one extreme, with the 
most residents being personally responsible for the most significant proportion of their own 
healthcare costs, and the English NHS finds itself at another, with most residents responsible for only 
minimal proportions of their own healthcare costs.  With these main differences in mind, we can 
now consider how these systems interact with cross-border solidarity: do they feed into a false 
perception of unearned generosity, or do they work so as to fight that perception? 
3. EU Healthcare Competences? 
How has EU law influenced the organization of public healthcare systems in the Member States?  
Under the Treaties, it cannot do so directly: Article 168(7) TFEU stresses that the EU has no 
competence to regulate the setup or financing of public health care systems in Member States.57  
Even in the areas where the EU does have competences that may affect national healthcare services, 
Hervey and McHale note that the CJEU and EU legislature tend towards attentiveness to both the 
structure of national health systems and how politically sensitive those structures are.58 
                                                          
56 See T Hervey, ‘Public Health Services and EU Law’ in M Cremona (ed), Market Integration and Public Services 
in the European Union (Oxford: OUP 2011), p 186. 
57 Generally, see T Hervey and J McHale European Union Health Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015) ch 3; U Neergaard 'EU Health Care Law in a Constitutional Light’ in J van de Gronden and others (eds) 
Health Care and EU Law (The Hague: TCM Asser, 2011); L Hancher and W Sauter EU Competition and Internal 
Market Law in the Health Care Sector (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
58 T Hervey and J McHale, ibid, p 545. 
However, the fact that the EU does not have competence to regulate public health setup or 
financing does not mean that it cannot have a significant impact on how public healthcare systems 
can be managed.59 The EU has never pretended otherwise: CJEU case law has regularly reminded 
Member States that EU membership ‘inevitably’ resulted in some changes needing to be made to 
the operation of its social services.60 Indeed, free movement of persons, on account of its enabling of 
so-called ‘benefit tourism’, has long been predicted to have such an effect. It is, as Hatzopolous 
describes it, a potential EU-originating source of interference in the historic ‘state business’ of 
organising the welfare state.61   
The next sections of this article will consider how EU migrants interact with the public healthcare 
systems of the four case study countries, so as to examine to what extent the healthcare ‘state 
business’ is affected by the EU rules that have created a mobile EU citizenry. 
4. EU Free Movement of Persons: Rights and Obligations 
a)  Workers 
From the early days of European integration, the EU legislature has attempted to eliminate as many 
deterrents from free movement of workers as possible.62  By the 1970s, EU secondary law ensured 
that when an EU national moved to another EU Member State for the sake of employment, they 
would not find themselves without social security coverage.  Once employed, they would become 
                                                          
59 See, inter alia, C O’Brien, ‘From Safety Nets’, above n 3; G Davies 'The Process and Side-Effects of 
Harmonisation of European Welfare States' (Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/06), available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/paper/the-process-and-side-effects-of-harmonisation-of-european-
welfare-states/  (accessed 2 January 2017) p 3; S Weatherill 'Competence and Legitimacy' in Barnard and 
Odudu (eds), above n 10, p 24; Dougan, ‘Expanding the Frontiers’, above n 10, pp 119-121; S O’Leary 
‘Developing an Ever Closer Union between the Peoples of Europe? A Reappraisal of the Case Law of the Court 
of Justice on the Free Movement of Persons and EU Citizenship’ (2008) 27(1) Yearbook of European Law 167, p 
4. 
60 Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of 
State for Health ECLI:EU:C:2006:325, para 121. 
61 V Hatzopoulos ‘Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU’ in de Burca (ed), above n 10, p 114.   
62 For a critical overview, see AJ Menendez ‘European Citizenship after Martinez Sala and Baumbast: Has 
European Law Become More Human but Less Social?’ in M Maduro and L Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of 
EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Oxford: Hart, 2010) pp 
368-372. 
part of the social security system of their host State on equal terms as host State national workers 
(Regulation 1612/6863) – and were they to move elsewhere, their social security build-up would 
move with them (Regulation 1408/7164).65  Health insurance schemes were covered under both 
Regulations as a form of benefit.66   
However, the Court of Justice’s interpretations of both a ‘worker’ and what benefits ‘workers’ were 
entitled to have pushed cross-border solidarity significantly further than EU legislation did.67  The 
Court’s case law has suggested that 10 hours of employment per week suffice to make a migrant EU 
national a ‘worker’ under EU law.68  To encourage free movement further, the direct family 
members of workers and the self-employed have been permitted to join their EU national 
worker/self-employed family member, and are equally entitled to social security in the host State.69  
In effect, the current EU rules on free movement of workers can result in a family of five—mother, 
father, three children—lawfully residing in a host Member State on the basis of employment of 10 
hours per week on the part of one of the parents.  That level of employment is unlikely to result in 
                                                          
63 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community [1968] OJ L 257/2. 
64 Regulation 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed 
persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ L 149/2. 
65 T Hervey ‘Mapping the Contours of European Union Health Law and Policy’ (2002) 8(1) European Public Law 
69, p 82; D Damjanovic and B de Witte ‘Welfare Integration through EU Law: the Overall Picture in the Light of 
the Lisbon Treaty’ in U Neergaard, R Nielsen and LM Roseberry Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law: 
From Rome to Lisbon (Copenhagen: DJOF, 2009) pp 60-62.  See also AP van der Mei Free Movement of Persons 
Within the European Community: Cross-Border access to Public Benefits (Oxford: Hart, 2003) pp 10-11, 25-26; 
M Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare: European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp 119-120. 
66 Regulation 1612/68, Art. 7(2) (where health insurance was deemed a ‘social advantage’), and Regulation 
1408/71, Title III. 
67 S O’Leary The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union 
Citizenship (Kluwer: London, 1996) pp 65-70; van der Mei, above n 65, pp 11-12. 
68 Case C-444/93 Megner & Scheffel ECLI:EU:C:1995:442, para 18. O’Leary (in ‘Free Movement of Persons and 
Services’ in P Craig and G de Burca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
2011) p 527) notes that although ‘migrant worker’ has an EU definition, it is unfortunately applied by national 
judges in ways that are ‘inevitably’ different. 
69 This has been the case since 1968; see Menendez, above n 62, p 369.   
an adequate income. However, EU law further obliges the host State to extend identical benefits to 
this family of EU citizens as their own national workers are entitled to.70   
Despite the existence of Regulations that show legislative approval of the Court’s case law on the 
free movement rights of workers,71 Questions have been raised in several Member States about 
whether this level of solidarity towards non-nationals is ‘fair’.  In the UK and Germany, for instance, 
recent EU migrant workers in these scenarios have been perceived as potentially benefiting from the 
host State system without adequately paying into the system or being integrated into the host 
State.72   
b) Economically Inactive EU Migrants 
Free movement rights of EU nationals have only expanded since these early days of encouraging the 
free movement of workers and the self-employed. Job-seeking EU nationals were among the first to 
benefit from this expansion.73 However, the CJEU has instead found that only those benefits that 
facilitate access to the employment market had to be extended to job-seekers, and then only when 
job-seekers can demonstrate having a connection to the host Member State.74 
This limitation of the rights of potentially economically active EU nationals suggested that if free 
movement rights were to be further extended to the economically inactive, it would not be on the 
                                                          
70 See M Dougan ‘The Court Helps Those who Help Themselves … The Legal Status of Migrant Work-Seekers 
under Community Law in the Light of the Collins Judgment’ (2005) 7(1) European Journal of Social Security 7, 
who notes that ‘part-time workers[‘] … potentially very limited contribution nevertheless entitles them to full 
equal treatment as regards social advantages’ (p 8). 
71 See, most recently, Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 April 2011 on 
freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1, replacing Regulation 1612/68; 
Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1, replacing Regulation 1408/71. 
72 See BBC ‘David Cameron urges EU support for migration plans’ (28 November 2014), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30224493 (accessed 20 May 2019); and BBC ‘Germany to revise EU 
migrant benefits to stop abuses’ (27 March 2014), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
26764283 (accessed 20 May 2019), reporting on a German government report that proposes excluding  EU 
migrant workers’ access to child benefits in Germany as these are obtained ‘too easily’. 
73 See Menendez, above n 62, 370. 
74 See, inter alia, Case C‑138/02 Collins ECLI:EU:C:2004:172; Case C‑258/04 Ioannidis ECLI:EU:C:2005:559; Case 
C-22/08 Vatsouras and Koupatantze ECLI:EU:C:2009:344. 
same terms that workers had such rights.  A compromise on the movement rights of students, the 
retired, and the independently wealthy was finally reached in 1990 after ten years of stalled 
negotiations by the EU legislature:  these EU nationals were simply not granted unconditional free 
movement rights.75  Key to their ability to move was the condition that they had ‘sufficient 
resources’ to not pose an ‘unreasonable burden’ on the finances of the host Member State, and that 
they had sickness insurance.76  Here, then, the EU legislature spelled out its limits of cross-border 
solidarity: host Member States were willing to host these economically inactive EU migrants, but 
were not willing to support them.  The 2004 Citizenship Directive77, replacing the 1990s directives on 
free movement of persons, only reiterated the restrictions set out in earlier versions of these pieces 
of legislation. The rights of the economically inactive thus have remained conditional.78   
The extent of those conditions remains unfortunately unclear.  Concepts such as ‘sufficient 
resources’ and ‘unreasonable burden’ have never been defined, though the Court has until recently 
ruled that blanket policies prohibiting benefit access to EU migrants are not compatible with the 
non-discrimination and equal treatment rights attached to EU citizenship.79  It thus established that 
economically inactive migrants who could demonstrate a ‘genuine link’ to their host States might be 
                                                          
75 O’Leary, Evolving, above n 67, p 99; van der Mei, above n 65, pp 44-46. 
76 See Directive 90/364/EEC of the Council of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 180/26, Art 1; 
Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who 
have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L 180/28, Art 1; and Directive 93/96/EEC of the Council of 29 
October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L 317/59, Art 1. 
77 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
[2004] OJ L 158/77. 
78 See, inter alia, H Verschueren ‘Free Movement of EU Citizens: Including for the Poor?’ (2015) 22(1) 
Maastricht Journal 10; F de Witte ‘The End of EU Citizenship and the Means of Non-Discrimination’ (2011) 
18(1) Maastricht Journal 86; C O’Brien ‘I Trade, Therefore I am: Legal Personhood in the European Union’ 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review 1643. 
79 See Case C-140/12 Brey ECLI:EU:C:2013:565; generally, see M Dougan and E Spaventa ‘Educating Rudy and 
the non-English Patient: A Double Bill on Residency Rights under Article 18 EC’ (2003) 28(5) ELRev 699, 700-
704; E Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in their 
Constitutional Context (London: Kluwer, 2007) pp 141-142.  The exception here is study grants, where the 
Court confirmed the acceptability of a 5-year blanket ban in Case C-158/07 Förster ECLI:EU:2008:630. 
entitled to access certain benefits.80  In its most expansionist era of EU citizenship case law, the 
Court consistently stressed that it was for the host State to demonstrate the ‘unreasonableness’ of 
the benefit claims being made by economically inactive migrants, largely by proving their lack of 
‘genuine link’ to the host State.81   
However, awareness of the political temperatures across Europe may have encouraged the Court to 
take a more cautious approach more recently: one that requires demonstrable integration before 
benefits must be extended to EU nationals by the host State,82 and one that even challenges the 
notion that ‘worker’ status automatically guarantees a suitable degree of integration.83  Indeed, the 
CJEU has since appeared to have undone decades of case law requiring proportionality assessment 
of benefit bans, and now indicates that certain blanket bans on benefits for economically inactive EU 
migrants are prima facie justifiable by the Member States out of concern for their public finances.84  
For our purposes, as of Brey the Court has held that if an economically inactive EU migrant is eligible 
for a need-based benefit, this is likely to be sufficient evidence that they do not possess ‘sufficient 
resources’, thus precluding them having a right to reside under the Citizenship Directive.85   
c) The Interaction Between Free Movement of Persons and Public Healthcare 
                                                          
80 Case C‑224/98 D’Hoop ECLI:EU:C:2002:432 para 38; for an overview of this case law, see P van Nuffel and N 
Cambien ‘De vrijheid van economisch niet-actieve EU-burgers om binnen de EU te reizen, te verblijven en te 
studeren’ (2009) 4 SEW 144. 
81 Regarding students, see D’Hoop; Case C-209/03 Bidar ECLI:EU:C:2005:169; Case C-75/11 Commission v 
Austria ECLI:EU:C:2012:605; C-532/11 and 585/11 Prinz and Seeberger ECLI:EU:C:2013;524; C-220/12 Thiele 
Meneses ECLI:EU:C:2013:683; and, regarding workseekers, see Collins; Vatsouras and Koupatantze; C-503/09 
Stewart ECLI:EU:C:2011:500. 
82 Dano; for commentary, see see D Thym ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Resident Rights of and Social 
Benefits for Economically Inactive Union Citizens’ (2015) 52 CMLRev 17, p 25. 
83 Verschueren, above n 78, pp 16-17, 33, referencing Case C-20/12 Giersch and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:411, 
paras 64-65. 
84 See Case C-67/14 Alimanovic ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 and C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, with commentary from A Iliopoulou-Penot, ‘Deconstructing the former edifice of Union 
citizenship?  The Alimanovic judgment’ (2016) 53 CMLRev 1007 and C O’Brien, ‘The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship 
in vain: Commission v United Kingdom’ (2016) 54 CMLRev 209.  See also N Nic Shuibhne, ‘What I Tell You Three 
Times is True”: Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’ (2016) 23(6) MJ 908. 
85 Brey (above n 79), para 63. 
The free movement of EU nationals interacts with public healthcare in two concrete ways.  First, the 
definition of a ‘worker’ has a potential impact on the funding for public healthcare systems.  Systems 
funded by taxation will receive variable income from EU national workers and no income from 
economically inactive EU migrants; but systems funded by insurance may not experience this kind of 
variability of contribution.   
Second, the interpretation of the conditions attached to the free movement of economically inactive 
EU migrants has significant consequences on their access to public healthcare systems.  Different 
interpretations of the requirement for sickness insurance, as well as the requirement of what an 
‘unreasonable burden’ and ‘sufficient resources’ entail, will either grant or deny mobile EU citizens 
access to a public healthcare system, regardless of their ability to contribute to that public 
healthcare system.  The next section of the article will illustrate that the interaction between EU free 
movement of persons and public healthcare manifests quite differently in the four case study 
Member States, with potentially significant consequences for both the Member States and the EU 
citizens wishing to move to them.   
5. Free Movement and Public Healthcare 
a)  EU Citizens’ Access in the Insurance-Based Model 
i) Workers 
In Belgium and in the Netherlands, there are ‘plus’ contributions made by all inhabitants, including 
workers; regardless of the income level of a worker, in the Netherlands, workers will have to pay out 
of pocket for a ‘nominal’ premium, as well as a co-payment for medical services if they actually 
require any.  In Belgium, the out-of-pocket expenses are particularly notable: on average Belgian 
residents (including workers) pay for approximately 30% of their own medical expenses through a 
variety of co-payments and un-covered charges.86 In other words, in these systems, all workers 
assume a substantial personal responsibility for paying towards their healthcare. 
There are benefits in place to help ameliorate these out-of-pocket expenses in both countries, but 
while these ameliorate the out-of-pocket healthcare costs, they do not erase them.  This is best 
demonstrated by example: a single EU citizen who qualifies as a ‘worker’ on account of 10 hours of 
genuine, effective work per week.  Such a worker, even if in receipt of employment-related benefits, 
would nonetheless pay out-of-pocket to an extent for their health care. In the Netherlands, for 
instance, a worker who engages in 10 hours of weekly employment at minimum wage would receive 
a ‘zorgtoeslag’ (a government benefit to help cover the cost of insurance) of 99 euros, which is 
highly unlikely to cover the entire nominal premium due each month.87  It also does not negate the 
mandatory ‘own risk’ payment, which cannot be compensated for with benefits.88  Similarly, a 
worker who engages in 10 hours of weekly employment at the minimum wage in Belgium would 
likely be entitled to the ‘higher reimbursement’ as well as a ‘Maximum Bill’ discussed above, but this 
would not negate that individual contributions would remain.89 The ‘higher reimbursement’ lowers, 
but does not eliminate individual contributions; and the ‘Maximum Bill’ applies only from 450 euros 
                                                          
86 S Callens and J Peers ‘Ontstaan en Kenmerken van het Belgische Gezondheidssysteem’ in Callens and Peers 
(eds), above n 15, pp 28-30. 
87 See Belastingdienst ‘Bedragen per maand’, above n 36. 
88 As of 2015, this is a local government policy matter, but most local governments indicate that social 
assistance cannot be applied for to cover the health insurance deductible.  Specific ‘standard’ insurance 
packages for low earners are made available through most local governments, but these only ‘remove’ the 
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at 18855.63 euros a year (see RIZIV ‘Verhoogde tegemoetkoming: grensbedragen van de inkomsten’ (30 
January 2019), available at http://www.inami.fgov.be/nl/themas/kost-terugbetaling/financiele-
toegankelijkheid/Paginas/verhoogde-tegemoetkoming-grensbedragen-inkomsten.aspx (accessed 20 May 
2019).  
per year, meaning that at least those first 450 euros of care costs would be contributed by individual 
EU migrants.90 
ii) Economically Inactive Migrants 
Belgium 
In the case of self-sufficient EU migrants, they are subject to the general rule that all persons 
registered in the natural registry of persons in Belgium are also entitled to enrol in a public sickness 
insurance fund.  For an EU migrant to be added to this registry, they must have confirmation of their 
EU residency status, and thus have demonstrated that they possess ‘comprehensive sickness 
insurance’ and ‘sufficient resources’.  Unless covered by home State social security, such insurance 
would need to be private insurance for the first six months, which is how long it can legally take for 
confirmation of residency status to be processed.  Comprehensive private insurance of this kind can 
be arranged through international insurance providers; however, even at prohibitive costs the 
coverage of such policies is limited, meaning that they satisfy the requirement of ‘comprehensive’ 
insurance only on a generous reading.91 Nonetheless, for a period lasting up to six months, self-
sufficient EU migrants will pose no burden on the Belgian public healthcare system: they will be 
charged for any care obtained, and may or may not receive costs of that care back from their private 
insurance provider. 
Following this initial period of requiring private insurance, registration with sickness funds will be 
possible.  Persons who join sickness funds on account of being listed on the natural registry of 
inhabitants must pay personal contributions that compensate for their lack of social contributions.  
These range, in 2019, from 0 euros per quarter to 744.61 euros per quarter, depending on the 
                                                          
90 See RIZIV ‘Types Maximumfactuur’, above n 25. 
91 For example, BUPA International quotes 280 euros per month for a 35 year old to be covered for both in and 
out-patient treatment and prescriptions under its Worldwide Health Options; this excludes pre-existing 
conditions, which can be included but at a further increase of cost, and even then carries with it a substantial 
number of additional exclusions.  (Quote obtained from Bupa International ‘Worldwide Health Options’ at 
https://www.bupaglobal.com/en/international-health-insurance/be on 8 May 2019.) 
‘income’ or means of the insured.92  Lower contributions are reserved for those persons who are in 
receipt of social assistance benefits on account of insufficient or low incomes, but the judgment in 
Brey and subsequent case law has made it very unlikely that an economically inactive EU migrant 
who qualifies for these benefits would be deemed to have ‘sufficient resources’ to reside in Belgium. 
Consequently, economically inactive EU migrants who actually hold confirmation of their right to 
reside are likely to pay either almost 750 euros per quarter for access to the Belgian public 
healthcare system, as well as the out-of-pocket fees that all residents of Belgium face. 
The Netherlands 
Self-sufficient EU migrants in the Netherlands will find that taking out a Dutch insurance policy is 
required for all those habitually resident (or intending to be habitually resident) in the Netherlands, 
and such a policy will satisfy the ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ requirement under Directive 
2004/38.  To ameliorate the ‘nominal’ premium costs, EU and Dutch nationals alike can in principle 
get a government benefit to help with the payment of the nominal health insurance premium.  
However, the ‘zorgtoeslag’ clearly meets the definition of ‘social assistance’ put forward by the CJEU 
in Brey, and consequently any economically inactive EU migrant who applies for this benefit upon 
arrival in the Netherlands is likely to be found to not have sufficient resources to avoid unreasonably 
burdening the host State.   
Consequently, the post-2006 Dutch social insurance system is set up so as to prevent economically 
inactive EU migrants from exercising their right to reside in the Netherlands if they cannot pay for 
the Dutch health insurance policy that the Netherlands requires them to have. 
b) EU Citizens’ Access to Healthcare in the Residency-Based Model 
i) Workers 
                                                          
92 RIZIV, ‘Persoonlijke Bijdragen’, above n 21. 
In residency-based systems, taxation aside, there are very few charges to low earning workers 
outside of the set charges for specific medical treatments, such as prescriptions or dental care in the 
UK.  Where low earners qualify for in-work benefits, they are even eligible for exemptions from 
those few charges.93  The 10-hour-a-week EU worker described above, as a result, should not pay 
out-of-pocket for any healthcare in the UK.94  Problematically, as O’Brien highlights, the 
administrative process of evaluating whether or not work is ‘genuine and effective’ may well exclude 
certain workers from benefits that would result in NHS exemptions.95 Correctly applied, however, 
‘genuine and effective’ will encompass any worker who engages in legitimate employment for 10 
hours a week, meaning that a contrary finding in the UK would violate EU law.   
As discussed, set charges are more expansive in Ireland than they are in the United Kingdom; 
however, genuinely low-earning workers, such as our example EU worker, would qualify for a 
medical card and consequently be entitled to fully free care.96  What this ultimately means is that 
those EU migrants who meet the interpretation the Court has given to ‘genuine and effective’ work 
actually receive free healthcare in the UK and Ireland97, whereas they would always contribute (to an 
extent) out-of-pocket to the Dutch and Belgian healthcare systems. 
                                                          
93 See NHS ‘NHS Low Income Scheme (LIS)’ (1 April 2017), available at https://www.nhs.uk/using-the-nhs/help-
with-health-costs/nhs-low-income-scheme-lis/ (accessed 20 May 2019). 
94 This is only theoretically changed by the UK’s 2014 introduction of a ‘Minimum Earnings Threshold’ for EU 
nationals before they are entitled to in-work benefits in the UK, as those who do not meet this earning 
threshold (of approximately 150 pounds per week) must still be evaluated on a per-case basis to see if their 
work is ‘genuine and effective’. (See Department of Work and Pensions ‘Minimum earnings threshold for EEA 
migrants introduced’ (21 February 2014), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/minimum-
earnings-threshold-for-eea-migrants-introduced (accessed 20 May 2019).)  
95 C O’Brien ‘The pillory, the precipice and the slippery slope: the profound effects of the UK’s legal reform 
programme targeting EU migrants’ (2015) 37(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 111, pp 119-120. 
96 Irish minimum wage is currently 9.80 euros per hour (see National Minimum Wage Order 2018, SI 
402/2018).  HSE policy makes medical cards for the under 65 are available for those who earn less than 184 
euros per week (see Citizens’ Information, ‘Medical card means test: aged under 70‘ (23 January 2019) 
available at 
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/health/medical_cards_and_gp_visit_cards/medical_card_means_test_
under_70s.html (accessed 20 May 2019)).   
97 There is an exception to the Irish treatment of the self-employed here: where self-employed persons earn 
an income of less than 5000 euros per year and are not liable social contributions (per Social Welfare 
Consolidated Act 2005, Schedule 1, Pt 3), they are not subject to the Irish social security system and 
consequently do not qualify for a medical card.  They may, all the same, qualify for treatment under the Irish 
healthcare system, but must pay out-of-pocket charges. (See HSE, HSE ‘Medical Card/G.P. Visit Card National 
ii) Economically Inactive Migrants 
The United Kingdom 
The entitlement of the economically inactive to public healthcare in England is not straight-forward.  
The currently applied definition of ‘ordinarily resident’ will cover a significant number of 
economically inactive EU migrants: the Department of Health guidance notes that its ‘six months’ 
benchmark cannot be exclusively applied, and some EU and British nationals may be ‘ordinarily 
resident’ from the day they arrive in the UK.98  Such self-sufficient migrants again are unlikely to 
receive exemptions for the minor NHS charges for dental care and prescriptions without losing their 
right to reside, but as noted above, these are minimal contributions indeed.  In short, NHS treatment 
for all EU citizens who satisfy the ‘ordinarily resident’ test is virtually free. 
For those EU migrants who do not satisfy an ‘ordinary residence’ test, or those who need to prove 
their right to reside, on the other hand, access to the NHS is precluded, and they must obtain 
‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ through some other means.  This is more problematic than it 
sounds.  EU migrants cannot ‘buy’ access to the NHS, short of paying for treatment as they receive it, 
which would not satisfy an ‘insurance’ requirement.  More worryingly, UK-based and international 
private cover that satisfies the residency requirements applied by the UK Home Office will only ever 
be largely comprehensive.99  As acknowledged by Sedley LJ in W and X, ‘private insurance rarely if 
ever covers all risks, such as the risk of requiring long-term medical care’.100  Furthermore, UK-based 
                                                          
Assessment Guidelines’ (February 2015), available at 
http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/list/1/schemes/mc/forms/medicalcardguidelines2015.pdf, para 6.2.3). 
98 Department of Health ‘Guidance’, above n 38, para 3.14. 
99 See Home Office ‘European Economic Area nationals qualified persons’ (20 November 2018), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/421238/Qualified_Persons_
v3_0.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019) p 35. 
100 W (China), X (China) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1494; [2007] 1 WLR 
1514, para 26.  Supplementary cover in the EU generally excludes pre-existing and chronic conditions; see S 
Thomson and E Mossialos ‘Private Health Insurance and the Internal Market’ in E Mossialos and others (eds) 
Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) p 460. 
private policies generally exclude GP and A&E services101– so while EU migrants cannot buy access to 
NHS treatment, primary and emergency care will be available to them (at no cost) regardless.   
What we thus find in the UK is that after a period of ‘visiting’ (that is unlikely to extend past six 
months), all economically inactive EU migrants in the UK appear to be entitled to effectively free 
NHS care.  In the awkward period between ‘visiting’ (which, under the Citizenship Directive, only 
occurs for three months) and ‘ordinary residence’, it is unclear how self-sufficient EU migrants are to 
obtain ‘legal’ access to secondary care in the UK.  Judging by the ‘ordinary residence’ test, the UK 
rules are very generous; but they are also problematic, as they appear to make it so that a significant 
number of economically inactive EU migrants simply will not be able to legitimately satisfy the UK’s 
interpretation of the ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ requirement for the entirety of their 
residence. 
Ireland  
If a self-sufficient EU migrant satisfies the ‘ordinarily resident’ test, they are entitled to use the Irish 
public healthcare system as any other resident, with only the usual out-of-pocket charges being due.  
The Irish ‘ordinary residence’ test, as discussed, is more straight-forward than the British one. Any 
EU national physically residing in Ireland for at least a year meets the requirements set by the Health 
Services Executive, and beyond that, any EU national able to demonstrate that they intend to reside 
in Ireland for at least a year would similarly qualify.102   
Much as UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) in the UK, however, the Irish Naturalisation & Immigration 
Service (INIS) demands private medical insurance for economically inactive EU migrants.103  For any 
EU national reliant on private insurance coverage, similar problems exist as do in the United 
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Kingdom.  Irish private insurance plans can exclude pre-existing conditions for five years, and 
coverage in general will normally only start 26 weeks after the policy is taken out. These plans are 
thus no more ‘comprehensive’ than the international private plans described above.104 Again, 
ensuring comprehensive healthcare coverage for such EU nationals appears impossible. Their 
reliance on the Irish public healthcare system seems likely, though it would not be ‘free’ reliance, as 
there are significant charges associated with secondary care in Ireland.  Additionally, because of the 
Irish separation of primary and secondary services, non-‘ordinarily resident’ EU nationals generally 
would be able to access a GP, but they would be charged for those services as all ‘ordinarily resident’ 
persons without a medical card would be.  In principle, there are very few ‘free’ services available to 
economically inactive EU migrants who are not ‘ordinarily resident’ in Ireland. 
The charges for private insurance and/or out-of-pocket care at the GP may be prohibitive for some 
economically inactive EU migrants, much as the premiums and social contributions in Belgium and 
the Netherlands may be.  Any economically inactive EU national will be ‘means-tested’ for a medical 
card; but, applying Brey, means-testing for a medical card is likely to result in either a finding that 
the EU national does not qualify for a medical card because they have ‘sufficient resources’, or that 
the EU national does not qualify for a medical card because they do not have ‘sufficient resources’ to 
legally reside in Ireland.  Consequently, economically inactive EU nationals in Ireland are likely to 
either have non-comprehensive private coverage, or to have sufficient resources to pay for the 
relevant out-of-pocket costs that the public healthcare system charges; where they lack these 
resources, they are neither permitted to reside in Ireland nor access its public healthcare services. 
c) In Summary: The Free Movement of Persons into Different Models of Public Healthcare 
What the above analysis reveals is that despite substantial differences in how each of these four 
countries organizes access to and financing of their public healthcare systems, there are broad 
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trends in the interaction between EU free movement of person law and public healthcare.  What 
Belgium and the Netherlands (and to a lesser extent, Ireland) demonstrate is that systems that 
charge individual patients for substantial portions of their care are significantly more EU-proof, in 
the sense that they will find it much easier to rebut the presumption of welfare/health tourism or 
‘unfair’ expenditure on recent EU migrants. Insurance-based systems make it easiest to include 
those who contribute, and exclude those who do not, without falling foul of EU non-discrimination 
rules.  In a system like the NHS, on the other hand, it is almost impossible to distinguish between 
new EU migrants and existing UK nationals without running afoul of the EU rules.  Attempts in both 
the UK and in Ireland to reduce cross-border solidarity towards the economically inactive results in 
demands for a form of private ‘comprehensive’ sickness insurance that does not appear to exist in 
either country; conversely, as all residents of Belgium and the Netherlands are required to have 
‘insurance’ to begin with, ‘unearned’ access rights in these countries can be curbed by simply 
restricting financial benefits that mitigate the costs of this insurance.   
In general, the analysis confirms that, as Schmidt has put it, ‘Member States with welfare systems 
relying on contributions face fewer problems [stemming from EU law] than those giving out tax-
financed benefits’105: both low-earning and economically inactive EU migrants are likely to be able to 
use NHS services without paying for anything beyond prescription costs.  EU migrants contribute 
more out-of-pocket in Ireland and more still in Belgium, but the ‘winner’ in contribution-focused 
system design is the Netherlands.  There, any resident will have to pay some form of ‘nominal’ 
premium, as well as the mandatory co-payment of several hundreds of pounds and a variety of 
additional out-of-pocket costs.  This is obviously a significant rebuttal to any existing misperceptions 
about the ‘cost’ and unfair burden that EU nationals moving to the Netherlands might face – but it is 
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difficult to see how that rebuttal can be replicated in residency-based systems without 
fundamentally changing the nature of their operation. 
d) Managing Public Misperceptions: Domestic Action or EU Action 
It is clear that developments like the UK’s June 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote are heavily rooted in public 
perception, and one of the perceptions that undoubtedly played a part in the UK’s referendum 
result is that EU law permits too much unrestricted migration, placing far too much pressure on 
public services (and specifically, the NHS) without ensuring appropriate levels of contribution.106  
This is not a UK-specific issue, however, and other Member States must also find ways to navigate 
public misconceptions about the cost of migration and ‘benefit tourism’ in organising their 
healthcare systems at a time when they are under severe budgetary pressure. 
Two potential political responses by Member State governments are imaginable.  One of these is the 
purely domestic response, as highlighted by Commissioner Viviane Reding in 2013 upon receiving 
complaints from various Member States (including the UK) about so-called ‘benefit tourism’ enabled 
by EU law:  
‘“It seems that some national systems are too generous,” said Ms Reding at a meeting of EU 
home ministers in Brussels. “Don’t blame the [European] Commission or EU rules for 
national choices and national regulatory systems.”107 
However, as the above analysis makes clear, an effective domestic response that is nonetheless EU-
law compliant will move towards individual responsibility for not only migrants, but for all 
beneficiaries of healthcare in a given Member State.  Such a market-oriented response may, in the 
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long run, result in most (if not all) Member States operating near-identical healthcare structures, 
simply to navigate the complex politics surrounding welfare and the potential intra-EU migration. If 
this were to happen, clearly the absence of explicit EU competence in healthcare organization would 
be revealed to be little more than a symbolic concession on the part of the EU; neither politically nor 
legally is this a desirable outcome, even if it could be assumed that all Member States operating 
residency-based healthcare systems would find the domestic political will to turn those healthcare 
systems into insurance-based ones. 
The alternative response requires explicit engagement with the EU. A political discussion regarding 
the protection of domestic healthcare organization in the EU would benefit all those Member States 
who operate systems that are not quite as market-driven as the Dutch one is.108 
If not through limits on EU competences, then, how can domestic healthcare systems be ‘protected’ 
from EU influence?   The above analysis made clear that it is not only the economically inactive EU 
citizen that represents a potential ‘unreasonable’ expense to host State healthcare systems.  
However, an EU-level reconsideration of what a ‘worker’ is remains implausible in the current 
political climate. It is difficult to imagine the EU heads of state coming to a definition of the concept 
that would not be so general so as to be open to Court interpretation regardless.  Similarly, any 
general EU measure to prevent economically active EU migrants from access to benefits would result 
in a revocation of 60 years of binding EU law agreed by the Member States in secondary legislation.   
Given the relevance of encouraging free movement of workers to the single market, it seems 
unlikely that permanent restrictions to access to benefits of the economically active can be agreed 
among the Member States.  The European Council/Commission-approved ‘emergency brake on 
benefits to EU nationals’ that David Cameron ‘achieved’ in February 2016 at most suggests that 
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temporary ‘unequal treatment’ may be tolerable109 – but it is not at all clear if Member States other 
than the UK would met the conditions warranting such a ‘brake’.110  
Permanent change will definitely be more feasible when it comes to the economically inactive.  
Indeed, at the end of 2016, the Commission launched a proposal for revising Regulation 883/2004 to 
further limit the conditions under which the economically inactive can access certain types of 
welfare in their Host states.111  Here, the Commission appears to have recognized the problem of 
requiring ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ in Member States operating residency-based 
healthcare systems: the proposal stresses that ‘Member States should ensure that economically 
inactive EU mobile citizens are not prevented from satisfying the condition of having comprehensive 
sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, as laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC. This may 
entail allowing such citizens to contribute in a proportionate manner to a scheme for sickness 
coverage in the Member State in which they habitually reside.’112  This non-binding statement in the 
recitals for the proposal is problematic in its own right, however: it suggests that requiring payment 
for public healthcare coverage only from economically inactive EU migrants in host States is 
appropriate, but does not address the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
nationality under Article 18 TFEU.  A specific EU secondary instrument—like, for instance, Directive 
2004/38/EC and its exceptions for equal treatment in Article 24(1)- permitting the Member States to 
charge only economically inactive EU migrants would be needed for the exceptions to Article 18 
TFEU apply, but such an instrument is not being proposed at this time. In that case, this proposed 
recital—still under debate at the time of writing—encourages Member States to adopt a policy that 
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either is not permissible under EU law, or that results in charging all residents for access to public 
health services: insurance, in other words. 
If residency-based healthcare systems are to remain politically viable in the EU, the Member States 
should re-coordinate social security in a way that safeguards their functioning.  Producing secondary 
legislation to further limit equal treatment for economically inactive EU citizens is but one way 
forward. An alternative solution to the problem outlined in this article might be to change 
responsibility of coverage, rather than scope.113 Instead of obliging Member State authorities to 
investigate entitlement of individual economically inactive EU migrants to host State healthcare, or 
demand payment for access for them in a healthcare system that does not operate on the basis of 
payment, EU law could instead stipulate that there is no immediate entitlement to healthcare at the 
host State’s expense.  Until a genuine link is formed in the host State, the home State can agree to 
retain responsibility for the healthcare of such migrants, as it would had if they did not exercise their 
right to free movement.114 For reasons of legal certainty, it would help if—as there is with 
permanent residence—there was a concrete time period attached to the obtaining of such a 
‘genuine link’.  To ensure that no EU migrants end up ‘un-linked’ from both home State and host 
State,115 and thus learning a crucial lesson from the extensive Court case law on the portability of 
study grants116, home State responsibility for providing healthcare coverage should become 
obligatory for these initial years of migration. The infrastructure for such a system is already in place: 
the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), after all, achieves home State cover for very short-term 
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‘free movers’.  Indeed, such a reallocation of responsibility for healthcare coverage could also be 
extended to economically active migrants: it does not deprive them of equal treatment, after all, but 
simply designates a different party as responsible for the cost of that treatment. Should the cost of 
‘home’-state health care coverage of EU migrants prove economically unviable, this too should be a 
matter for EU-level negotiation and legislative action.117 
e) Conclusion 
In the ideal world, misconceptions about the effects of EU free movement can be combatted with 
statistics and other facts; but in designing social policy responses, the validity of public concerns is 
usually an afterthought to simply addressing whatever the concerns are.  Organization of healthcare 
systems in the EU Member States is unlikely to be an exception to this phenomenon: ageing 
populations, increasingly expensive technologies, and budgetary pressure from both the EU and 
domestic politics are all persistent problems, and at times of budgetary constraint, cross-border 
solidarity tends to be limited, if not simply absent.   
Rather than encouraging Member State governments to effectively cut the depth of free healthcare 
provision they offer their own nationals so as to not have to extend it to EU nationals as well, a more 
palatable way to address the misconception is to use the EU’s own structure of cooperation to 
construct a form of cross-border cooperation that will be seen as ‘fair’ by a public that is increasingly 
sceptic about the benefits of both migration and the EU. 
Switching to an ‘extended EHIC’ system comes with limited practical consequences for EU citizens’ 
actual ability to access healthcare, both in terms of quality and affordability, but will prove the EU to 
be responsive to political concerns about the EU and its competences, however misguided those are.  
Not only will this make it more possible to preserve different models of public health services within 
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the EU, but it may help preserve the EU project as a whole in what are uncertain and increasingly 
Eurosceptic times. 
